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I shall first state what I shall be trying to maintain in this 
lecture in respect principally to belief, but also in respect of a 
man's aims and sentiments and intentional states generally. 
My thesis will be that, no matter what experimental knowledge 
of the previously unknown causes that determine a man's be-
liefs is accumulated, that which a man believes, and also that 
which he aims at and sets himself to achieve, will remain up to 
him to decide in the light of argument. I want to suggest some 
grounds for the compatibility of the law of causality and the 
freedom of the subject to form his own beliefs, aims, and inten-
tions by reasoning. Secondly, I want to point to a generally 
unrecognized consequence of taking the doctrine that the physi-
cal states of the organism determine uniquely corresponding 
states of mind. This is of course not the only, or even the usual, 
sense of "materialism"; but it is one possible sense. I shall argue 
that when this causal dependence of states of mind upon physi-
cal states of th(' organism is known to hold, then the dependent 
states of mind become, in virtue of the knowledge of the de-
pendence, a form of perception. This was a consequence of the 
materialist hypothesis, and one which Spinoza saw; but most of 
those contemporary philosophers who have argued for some 
form of materialism have not perceived, or have not stressed, 
this consequence. 
I shall not be trying to disprove, or to contradict, anything 
that could properly be called a thesis of determinism: e.g. the 
proposition "every event has a cause," or "every event is an 
instance of some natural law, which explains its occurrence by 
reference to some set of initial conditions." About these prop-
ositions I would only say that they seem to me to be illegitimate-
ly general, and for that reason vacuous. Because nothing would 
count as finding a negative instance to them, nothing would 
count as finding a good reason to believe that they are true or 
that they are false. Therefore they, and their negations, will 
play no part in my argument. But I am ready to agree that, 
given that we have any true statement of fact about a state of 
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mind, e.g. that Jones believes that there is a lectern in the next 
room, then we can always look for, and may expect ultimately 
to find, an explanation of this fact by reference to some set of 
initial conditions, which will, in normal circumstances, con-
stitme sufficient conditions of Jones having this belief. I am 
also ready to agree that this request for an explanation of psy-
chological fact, if pressed far enough, and pressed successfully, 
will always include, as one element in the whole explanation, 
an experimentally confirmed covering law. That is, I am ready 
to agree that there is no a priori reason why, given that a psycho-
logical fact is specified by a description, and given that we hold 
this description of the explicandum constant, we should not 
find an explanation under a covering law, experimentally con-
firmed. 
Suppose my name to be Jones and I speak. I say "It is a fact 
that I believe that there is a lectern in the next room." I can 
give you my reasons for believing, which, in the normal case, I 
believe to be good reasons, or at least not altogether bad ones. 
I give you my reasons, and then say "Now you know why I 
believe that there is a lectern in the next room; you have the 
explanation of my belief." I have not told you all that you 
might conceivably have wanted to know when you inquired 
why Jones had this belief. I have not claimed to give you 
an explanation that amounts to specifying a sufficient condition 
of the belief. I have only claimed to mention one interesting 
condition which I take to have been a necessary condition for 
the consequence, or at least a cause, on this occasion. I have 
committed myself to the assertion that, had I not recently been 
in the room and seen something that looked like a lectern there 
(this being my reason), and if everything else in my situation 
had remained the same, I would have been more doubtful of 
the existence of a lectern in the next room than I in fact am, at 
least for some interval of time. When I give my reason for 
believing something, and claim to be accurate in this piece of 
autobiogTaphy, I state another belief, and a sketch of an argu-
ment which was in some sense present to my mind, or which 
would have come to mind, if I had been challenged; and I am 
committed to the hypothetical statement that, if this belief, 
andfor sketch of an argument, had been shown to be erroneous, 
I would in fact have reconsidered, or weakened, the belief 
which was their consequence. I am committed to no more than 
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this by offering you the reason for my belief. But also I am 
committed to no less. I am therefore implicitly denying that 
sufficient conditions of my holding the belief at that time about 
the lectern in the next room can be found in states of the or-
ganism, or of the environment, which do not include the belief, 
andfor sketch of an argument, that constitute my reason. I am 
not committed to denying that there existed in the state of the 
organism, and of the environment, conditions that were neces-
sary to explain my holding the supporting belief or my follow-
ing the supporting argument to its conclusion. If, for example, 
you were interested in the causal explanation of an error of 
Jones' about the objects in the next room, you might find an 
adequate explanation in some state of his organism. Equally if 
you were interested in Jones' surprising ability to form true 
beliefs about objects in the next room, you might find some 
adequate explanation in the state of his organism and of the 
environment. By manipulating and changing the relevant 
states of the organism and of the environment, you might there-
by change his true beliefs into erroneous ones and his erroneous 
beliefs into true ones. But if Jones' account of the reason for 
his belief was a true one, then the states of the organism and 
of the environment were necessary, but not sufficient, condi-
tions for his belief. 
How does Jones know what the reason for his belief that 
there is a lectern in the next room is or was? Sometimes of 
course he does not know, and particularly in these perceptual 
cases; but sometimes he does know. In one simple type of case 
he knows the reason for his belief, just because he gives his 
assent to a proposition, under a certain condition or proviso, 
and this condition is that which he gives as his reason when he 
is asked. \Vhen asked whether there was a lectern in the next 
room, he might have answered "Yes, there is, if the room which 
I have just visited is the next room to this one, as I believe it 
to be, and if that tall thing which I saw in the corner is a lectern, 
as I believe it to be." Here he has spelt out in conditional form 
his belief together with its ground. In general we form beliefs 
which we are ready to revise if other beliefs that we hold are 
shown to be false. One belief is conditional upon another and 
upon a reasoning process of some kind, which at each step in-
volves a belief. I could for some purposes present my beliefs as 
a chain of beliefs connected by reasoning, and therefore in con-
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ditional form, and without detachment. When I am forming 
my beliefs in conditions of uncertainty, they present themselves 
to me with some of their conditions attached. When I am asked 
to give my reason for a belief that I hold, and that I have de-
tached, I am asked to reconstruct some of the chain of condi-
tions upon which it depends. In this reconstruction I do not 
need to appeal to a general covering law in order to assure 
myself that I have found a necessary condition of my detached 
belief. For I know that this belief was formed conditional upon 
others. Exactly the same may be true when I form an intention 
or adopt an aim. I may form it or adopt it subject to certain 
conditions, which I could either specify in conditional form, or 
produce as my reasons for forming that intention or having that 
aim. In cases where I have the conditional intention of leaving 
early if it rains, the rain can be given as my reason for leaving 
early, if this is what I finally do. Similarly in cases where I will 
only believe something if certain observations were actually 
made, then these observations can be given as my reasons for 
believing. These are the simple cases, which illustrate the possi-
bility of knowing the implied singular hypothetical proposition 
to be true without appeal to a covering law. 
I am not arguing that a man cannot be mistaken in giving 
his reasons for a belief or for having a certain aim. He can, and 
often he is mistaken. An argument from parallel cases may lead 
to the conclusion that his alleged reasons ought to be regarded 
as rationalisations, which do not at all explain his belief or his 
intention. The argument from parallel cases might be sufficient 
to convince us that the supporting belief, andfor reasoning, was 
not a necessary condition of the ensuing belief: that he would 
not in this case for a moment have suspended or weakened his 
ensuing belief, if the supporting belief andjor reasoning had 
been shown to be erroneous. I am only arguing that we do not 
tzeed inductive, experimental argument in order to be assured 
justifiably that so-and-so is the reason for a belief or an in-
tention. 
This rough outline of an account of "being my reason for 
believing p" can be generalized, and applies equally to my rea-
sons for wanting, my reasons for doing, and my reasons for 
having a certain attitude towards an object, or for feeling a 
certain emotion about it. \Vhenever I state "This is my reason, 
and it is my only reason," there is a singular hypothetical prop-
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osition entailed. Suppose that the reason for an action specifics 
a belief about some features of the action, e.g. its consequences: 
"I am doing it because it would help my friend." Then the 
entailed hypothetical is "If I did not believe that it would help 
my friend, I would become, at least for a time, more uncertain 
about doing it; I would reconsider." If this is given as my rea-
son in the past ("My reason for doing it was ... "),then the im-
plied proposition is the hypothetical "If I had not believed that 
it would help Jones, I would have reconsidered doing it; that is, 
I would have been more uncertain, at least for a time, whether 
I was going to do it." This hypothetical proposition can be 
relevantly challenged by an appeal to inductive evidence; but 
the subject may be justified in claiming to know that it is true 
merely in virtue of his memory of his calculations at the time. 
So "x is his reason for .p-ing" entails the hypothetical "If he was 
shown that x includes a false belief, he would become more 
doubtful whether to 4> or not," or "he would reconsider whether 
he would .p or not." My becoming doubtful ·whether I would 4> 
or not, during deliberation, and when reasons are in place, 
amounts to the same as reconsidering. For my becoming sure 
that I will do so-and-so, that I believe so-and-so, that I am fright-
ened of so-and-so, amounts to deciding; deciding, in the sense 
that, if I have first been uncertain whether I will do so-and-so, 
believe so-and-so, want so-and-so, fear so-and-so, and then con-
sider the matter, my becoming sure, for some reason, brings it 
about that I intend to do so-and-so, want so-and-so, fear so-and-
so, believe so-and-so. So we get the sequence of hypotheticals: 
if I lose some confidence in the validity of the reasons that ex-
plain my belief, intention, desire, attitude, or emotion, I lose 
some confidence that this is my intention, desire, attitude, or 
emotion. While I lose confidence, I cease to intend, want, be-
lieve, fear, etc. The two suggestions here are (1) that being sure 
of the object believed, intended, wanted, feared, makes that the 
object, (2) that the reasons for intending, wanting, fearing, be-
lieving, can be entered, in these cases of deliberation, into the 
full characterization of the intention, the desire, the fear, or the 
belief. The reason is in this sense internal to the state of mind, 
although it may also be a partial explanation of the state of 
mind. To classify my state as fear about so-and-so, or anger with 
so-and-so about so-and-so, is already to imply a partial explana-
tion of the perturbed state of mind. 
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The allegation that explanation of states of mind by reasons 
is a distinct kind of explanation from explanation by causes, is 
unclear, and, insofar as it is clear, undemonstrated. But there 
is a distinction between two kinds of hypothetical proposition 
which may be involved in explanation; the first kind does not 
require the support of a covering law whenever someone claims 
to know that there is a true explanation, although it may be 
challenged by an appeal to a well-confirmed covering law. The 
second kind of explanation does require the appeal to a cover-
ing law, or at least to the evidence of parallel cases, if a claim to 
knowledge is to be justified at all. Consider the following: 
I. "I would not like that person, if he did not have that 
particular quality." 
2. "I would not want to go there, if they took the casino 
away." 
3. "I would not have gone to the opera last night, if Callas 
had not been singing." 
4. "I would not have believed that, if I had not had his 
eye-witness account." 
5. "I would not be frightened of going up in the elevator, 
if it were larger." 
In each case the condition stated in the if-clause gives a 
reason which will serve as a partial explanation. At the same 
time the condition stated can be viewed as specifying more fully 
the intention, the desire, the fear, the belief, the state of mind. 
I may simply recall that my intention to go to the opera was in 
this way conditional. But the reason and the partial explana-
tion may be shown to be a mere rationalisation. Inductive 
arguments from parallel cases may lead me to doubt whether 
the statement of my reason is acceptable, that is, whether the 
implied hypothetical is true; just as inductive argument from 
parallel cases may lead me to doubt whether an unconditional 
statement of intention is true, even though I do not need to 
support a statement of intention with inductive evidence that 
I will in fact try to perform the action when the time comes. 
The question "How do you know that this was your reason?," 
and even more, the question "How do you know that this is 
your reason?," are odd and require a special context; but the 
questions "Are you sure that this was your reason?," and "Are 
you sure that this is your reason?" are normal. It is worth 
noticing that in this context I may give what would be my 
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reason for doing something in advance, and before I had de-
cided whether to do it or not; and similarly for belief. Balanc-
ing the several reasons for believing or disbelieving the story 
that I have been told, I may say that these would be my only 
reasons for believing the story, even when I am not sure whether 
I do believe it or not. In cases of this kind the reasons for be-
lieving, or for acting, or for feeling, are incomplete explana-
tions; we can always ask why did those reasons actuate you at 
that particular time, while they did not influence others rele-
vantly like you, or why they did not influence you on relevantly 
similar occasions. 
Let us turn back to the situation of someone who has a be-
lief when there is evidence that sufficient conditions (with the 
ordinary reservations that must always be attached to this 
phrase) exist in the state of the physical organism for his hold-
ing this belief. There are two possibilities: first, that he does 
not know that his belief can be adequately explained by the 
physical state of the organism: secondly, that he comes to know 
that his belief can be adequately explained by the physical state 
of the organism. Of the first case, a belief explicable by hypno-
tism would be an example, if we knew of a physical mechanism 
upon which the success of hypnotic suggestion depends. Let us 
suppose that we acquire this knowledge. Any reasons that the 
victim offers in partial explanation of his belief under hypno-
tism will be rationalisations. The reasons will be no part of the 
explanation of his belief, and it will not be true that, if his rea-
sons are shown to contain error, he will for a moment reconsid-
er, and be for a moment more doubtful about his belief. He 
will simply substitute another reason, clinging all the time to 
the suggested belief. I will leave aside the suggestion that all 
our beliefs, and all our intentions, might rest on rationalisa-
tions in this way, without asking whether this is a coherent 
suggestion. At least we know of some clear cases of rationalisa-
tion. 
Turn to the case where the subject comes to know the ade-
quate explanation of his belief. Then the question is unavoid-
ably raised for him of whether there is a correlation between 
the physical state of the organism and his belief in the specific 
proposition in question being true; that is, he must ask himself 
whether there is a rational connection between his organism 
being in a certain state and there being in fact a lectern in the 
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next room. In other words, he has to evaluate the discovered 
causes of his already formed belief as evidence of the truth of 
the belief. While he is evaluating the causes of his former belief 
as evidences of truth, his belief is suspended, and becomes only 
an inclination to believe. For if he says (to himself or to 
another), "I now know why I have believed this, but I don't 
yet know whether the causes are reasons for believing or not," 
he is not expressing a present belief. Suppose that he finds that 
there is indeed a correlation between the operation of these 
causes and his holding a true belief; then he has learnt how he 
knows, or why he believes, that there is a lectern in the next 
room, in the sense that he has learnt the mechanism which is 
at work. So a man might all his life have been able to judge 
the distances and sizes of objects seen from a great height, with-
out knowing the mechanism that was at work, and in this sense 
without knowing how he knew, or why he believed, that one 
object was further away than another on a particular occasion. 
He previously was unable to give his reason for believing that 
the tower was further away than the bridge, and, because he was 
unable to give the reason, there is a sense in which he had 
no reason for the belief; namely, that there was no true hypo-
thetical proposition present to his mind, or specifiable by him 
on request, of the form "I would have reconsidered whether 
the tower was further away from the bridge, if I had not be-
lieved so-and-so." '"'e have a choice here: the language allows 
us to say both that he just had the belief without a reason, and 
also allows us to say that there was a reason which he did not 
know and which he has now learnt. So the connoisseur who can 
tell on sight the date of certain works of art, but cannot say how 
he tells, may be said to have a reason, which might be disclosed 
by interfering with clues. By suppressing some information 
which he was receiving, without his being distinctly aware of it 
and of its efficacy, we may discover the dues which he is "using," 
without his knowing that he was "using" them. Or he may be 
said to tell without having any reason at all. 
But the interesting difference is the difference that is made 
by his coming to know how he forms his beliefs, or whence he 
derives his knowledge. Then he again has the evaluative ques-
tion, like the man who has discovered that there exists a physical 
state of the organism which is a sufficient condition of his belief. 
Now knowing the me<:hanism, he must raise the question of 
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whether there is a reliable correlation between the physical 
state of the organism and the truth of the relevant belief. If he 
discovers there is such a correlation, then he has acquired a 
reason for now, and henceforth, endorsing the inclinations to 
believe which occur when the physical state of the organism is 
present. If there is, as far as he can discover, no such reliable 
correlation, then his inclination to believe, which will now be 
his state of mind, will no longer be for him a reason for actually 
believing. The hypnotist's victim, who could be made to be-
lieve false or true propositions indifferently, was ignorant, while 
hypnotized, of the adequate explanation of his belief. If he had 
known, while under the influence of the hypnotist, that his 
beliefs were adequately explained by the hypnotist's sugges-
tions, as sufficient conditions in themselves, and that these sug-
gestions were not sufficient evidences of truth, then his beliefs 
would have been only inclinations to believe. For a man distin-
guishes "I believe p" from "I am inclined to believe p," as re-
ports of his state of mind, precisely by the implication (not 
entailmem) which is attached to the first-person and not to the 
second- and third-person uses of the verb-namely, "p is to be 
believed." 
Consider the following design of an experiment. An adver-
tiser wishes to have some scientific foundation for his attempts 
to influence the beliefs of a certain class of consumers. He wants 
to know what are the sufficient, or under normal conditions, 
nearly sufficient, conditions of their believing that they are 
suffering from a certain physical weakness and need a certain 
kind of tonic. He therefore arranges an elaborate experiment, 
to assess the efficacy of his techniques of brain-washing. He is 
allowed to vary the stimuli from the environment and to vary 
the state of the organisms, only provided that he does not hring 
about the state of affairs which he wishes his subjects to belie\'e 
exists. My suggestion is that if he asks the brain-washed group 
to report changes in their beliefs, as he changes the state of their 
organisms and the stimuli from the environment, he must refrain 
from telling them what he is doing; for if he tells them what he 
is doing, then they am only report changes in their "beliefs," in 
an inverted-comma sense, and their changing states of mind are 
more properly described as their inclinations to believe. The 
experiment otherwise cannot be carried through. The subjects 
are bound, by the sense of the concept of belief, to regard their 
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belief reports as reports of inclinations to believe, if they do 
not believe that the changes in their organisms and in the envi-
ronment can be shown to be means of sharpening their powers 
of discovery. 
The presence of the clues by the use of which I unknowingly 
form my veridical beliefs about physical objects, will be a suffi-
cient condition, taken together with the normal state of organ-
ism, of my forming these beliefs. When I have learnt the 
mechanism from the scientific study of perception, I may use 
this knowledge to protect myself against error, and thus employ 
a method of inference which was not available to me before. 
i\Iy beliefs, even in the normal cases, will then have a different 
explanation from before, merely in virtue of this new precau-
tion against error: another factor has been added. Unless I 
believed that the mechanism was working normally and along 
the standard path towards discovery of truth, I would not now 
endorse the inclination to believe which is its outcome; and 
this hypothetical proposition I may know to be true directly. 
When my belief is based on inference, and has been reached 
after precautions against error, there is always a hypothetical 
proposition that could be quoted to specify one of the neces-
sary conditions of my belief. 
One sees therefore why the phrase "the causes of the belief" 
sounds odd, if "causes" is interpreted as sufficient conditions 
(with the necessary reservations). For sufficient conditions of 
belief are immediately converted into sufficient conditions for 
an inclination to believe, when the conditions become known 
to the subject and are believed by him not to be reliable indices 
of truth; or the sufficient conditions of belief, hitherto, become 
reasons for belief, when the conditions become known to the 
subject and are taken by him to be reliable indices of truth. 
But this is not to say that the phrase "the causes of the belief" is 
improper, or that there cannot be sufficient conditions of par-
ticular beliefs, both of true beliefs and of false beliefs: looking 
lJllch to beliefs that have been held by me, or that are now held 
by others, I can indeed seek to explain them adequately, as I 
can seek to explain any other phenomenon. But one must al-
ways allow for the fact that an increment to the subject's knowl-
edge of the factors that are determining, and that explain, his 
current beliefs will by itself change the account that will have 
to be given of why he believes. 
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A similar complexity attends the explanation of a man's 
intentional actions. Given that we have the specification of a 
man's intention at a particular time to act in a particular way, 
and provided that we hold this description constant, we can seek 
an adequate explanation of the fact in some covering law, which 
will correlate such an intention with some initial conditions, 
normally including those desires and beliefs which the subject 
would give as his reasons. But we have to allow for the fact that 
an increment to the subject's knowledge of the factors, other 
than his own specifiable reasons, which explain his intentions 
must complicate his intentions in one way or another. Suppose 
that he learns that, in addition to the reasons that he would give 
to explain his intention, there are certain other necessary condi-
tions to be observed in the state of his organism and in the 
inputs that explain this state of the organism. He has learnt 
that he would not have acted in the way that he is acting, if 
these conditions had not existed. In virtue of this knowledge, 
there is at least one account of his intention that becomes ap· 
plicable, even when his original intention is not otherwise 
altered: namely, that he intends to allow his conduct to be 
determined by these factors rather than, e.g., to test their effects 
on him or to try to escape their effects on him. 
If one accepts, as I do, that no limits can be set a priori on 
the scope of scientific explanation, one must still observe that 
scientific explanation requires that the description of the phe-
nomenon to be explained must be held constant from the be-
ginning of the inquiry to its conclusion. If a man comes to 
believe that his state of confidence in the excellence of his per· 
formance is wholly explained by a confidence-engendering pill 
which he has taken, he will no longer be so confident of the 
excellence of his performance. From the standpoint of the 
doctor, there is an identifiable and isolable state of mind, a state 
of confidence, which might have been produced by the pill, 
provided that the subject is ignorant of the cause, and which 
might have been produced by an excellent performance. From 
the standpoint of the subject, there is a state of tranquillity, 
which will only be a state of confidence while it is believed by 
him to have a certain explanation. The peculiarity of the ex-
planation of intentional states-beliefs, intentions, attitudes of 
mind, desires-is that the subject's acquisition of knowledge 
about the explanation, or a change in his beliefs about the 
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explanation, modifies the descriptions applicable to the phe-
nomenon explained, and also modifies the explanation itself. 
This is not a ground for suspending, or despairing of, the search 
for scientific understanding of mental states of any kind. On 
the contrary: the more I learn of mechanisms that may explain 
the past occurrences of these states, the more I am in a position 
to anticipate, and either to modify or to reinforce them, as I 
choose. 
We see this complexity in the explanation of intentional 
states most clearly if we trace the full implications of the tradi-
tional, 19th-century materialist hypothesis. Suppose that we 
asume that for every distinct state of mind, and particularly for 
every distinct emotion, marked in the common vocabulary, 
there exists a distinct physical state of the organism which is 
invariably correlated with it. It would be surprising if this 
hypothesis turned out to be true, or even approximately true, 
if only because the distinctions among emotions marked in the 
common vocabulary have been made, and made gradually, to 
serve a variety of quite different, non-theoretical purposes. But 
let us disregard the implausibility of the hypothesis, so crudely 
formulated. For it is enough to consider a single possible case 
falling under the general hypothesis: for example, that with the 
emotion of anger there is an invariably correlated state of the 
organism, which can be stimulated by some physical inputs, and 
removed by other physical inputs, with immediate correspond-
ing effects on the emotion: these correlations are to be sup-
posed to hold in spite of variations in the objects, and the specifi-
able reasons, for the subject's anger. In all cases we find that 
subjects cease to be angry with x, and to be angry with x because 
of y, if the appropriate physical change is made; they only con-
sider y as a reason for being angry when they are in the appro-
priate physical state; and when they are in the appropriate phys-
ical state, they always find some reason for being angry with 
someone. If the facts were discovered to be exactly as supposed 
-which is of course extremely improbable-we should have to 
say that the reasons which men had given in explanation of 
their being angry were really rationalisations: for we should 
have discovered that all the implied hypothetical propositions-
" IE such-and-such an injury, as I considered it to be, had not 
occurred, I would not, at least for a time, have been so angry"-
were false; I would have been just as angry, if, and only if, the 
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appropriate physical state existed, and I would have immedi-
ately found some other reason for being angry. \Ve will im-
plausibly suppose, for the sake of the hypothesis, that being 
angry consists merely in having certain feelings and being dis-
posed to behave in certain ways, and does not entail a certain 
belief of the subject in a specific reason for the disposition. So 
it has been discovered that the state of anger, whenever it oc-
curs, does not in fact co-vary with any variation in the subject's 
independently established beliefs about the situation, but is 
varied only by a change in his physical state. 
Neglect, if you will, the vast accumulation of evidence from 
experience which we have and which te11s against this hypothe-
sis: the evidence from experience that our anger does some-
times change as a result of an argument that convinces us that 
there is nothing to be angry about, and change in such a way 
that we have good grounds for believing that a belief was a 
necessary condition of the anger occurring. If the implausible 
hypothesis were verified, we should say that the state, which we 
had been calling anger, was a perception of a certain physical 
state; when we are angry, we are really perceiving a modifica-
tion of our body in its interaction with the environment. \Ve 
are perceiving, or feeling, this state, in the same sense that we 
feel a bruise or that we feel the heavy object on our back; and a 
feeling of this kind counts as a perception, in so far as we arc 
able immediately and reliably to infer the change in the state 
of the body from the experience. We could speak of perceiving 
an external object, in so far as there was a physical cause of the 
change in the bodily state, the presence of which was immedi-
ately and reliably inferred from an inner feeling. In so far as 
smelling the flowers in the room counts as perceiving that the 
flowers are there, any similar immediate and reliable inference 
from a sensation to the external physical cause, which affects the 
body by an understood, regular process, wi11 count as a percep-
tion of the cause. If we found that a certain feeling, which we 
had previously associated with certain beliefs and had distin-
guished as one of the emotions, was in fact reliably correlated 
with a certain physical stimulus from a certain kind of physical 
object, we should say that we are perceiving that kind of object, 
when the feeling occurs: perceiving it, in the extended sense 
in which smelling it is perceiving it. When we understand the 
physical mechanism by which the effect is produced, we have a 
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reliable method of immediate inference to the presence of the 
cause; and the inference in time becomes a habit to such a 
degree that it is no longer thought of as an inference. 
I dwell on this Spinozistic consequence of taking one version 
of the materialist hypothesis seriously because it brings out the 
consequences of learning, and of coming to /mow, the mecha-
nisms upon which the occurrence of the state of mind depends. 
One is liable to be persuaded that the consequence of such dis-
cm•eries would be a helplessness, or a sense of helplessness: as 
if men would have depressingly discovered that their ability to 
modify and control their own beliefs, desires and sentiments, as 
they think fit on reflection, was in fact zero, or near to zero. 
This is a mistake. The coming to know about the mechanism, 
about the cause of a certain distinguishable type of state of 
mind, opens the way to a method of inference which can pro-
ceed from the state of mind to the external cause. Knowledge 
of a causal mechanism is converted into knowledge of a reality 
external to the mind. A person is an instrument which records 
the effects of stimuli, and the consequent changes of bodily 
states, in the experience of psychical states; but a person is an 
instrument which also reads, and interprets, its own recorded 
results, and, in reading and interpreting them, in a sense 
changes the result. For the recorded result in a psychical state, 
as interpreted by the subject in the light of new knowledge of 
the explanation of the state, has for the subject a different sig-
nificance, and therefore constitutes, by a relevant criterion, a 
different state; just this is the intentional component in psychi-
cal states. The state which began as anger with Jones for some-
thing he had done, has now become an awareness of a changed 
physical state, in relation to which Jones' action was merely an 
inessential occasion. Since the subject no longer believes Jones' 
action to be a necessary element in the explanation of his state, 
there is a good sense in which he is no longer angry with Jones 
for what he has done; in this sense the knowledge of the ex-
planation has changed the state of mind. But a scientist may 
regard the state of mind simply as an experience, abstracting 
from the subject's own beliefs about the explanation of it; and 
he may have shown by experiment that this experience, so 
identified as the experience that the man had when he ignorant-
ly took himself to be angry, is to be explained by a clearly iden-
tifiable physical state. The subject, once convinced of the truth 
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of the scientist's explanation, will determine his attitude to 
Jones' action all over again. 
There is for this reason an unclarity, or even an ambiguity, 
in the otherwise acceptable statement that the occurrence of 
any state of mind can in principle be explained like any other 
natural phenomenon, by reference to an experimentally con-
firmed covering law, which correlates such an occurrence with 
some set of initial conditions. This statement is true, when a 
proviso is added that is uniquely applicable to intentional 
states: that the subject's knowledge of the explanation by cover-
ing law will by itself change the state explained, even though 
the lawful connection does continue to hold between the initial 
conditions and the same state of mind, as identified under a 
description used in the relevant science, but not as identified 
under the description which the subject himself will apply. 
The discovered physical causes of anger are the causes of that 
independently identifiable state which the subject previously 
classified as anger, thereby explaining the state in a way which 
he now knows to have been erroneous. The causes of that state 
which he has previously classified as anger will no longer be 
causes of anger. This is the reason why the causal explanation 
of intentional states and processes is not a simple matter. In 
Spinoza's tenninology, the reflexive knowledge of the causal 
mechanism constitutes a change in the effect. And this is the 
complexity which makes a place, as Spinoza suggested, for 
freedom of mind. 
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The E. H . Lindley Memorial Lectureship Fund was established 
in 1911 in memory of Ernest H. Lindley, Chancellor of the Uni-
versity of Kansas from 1920 to 1939. In February 1941 Mr. Roy 
Roberts, the chairman of the committee in charge, suggested in the 
Graduate Magazine that 
the Chancellor should invite to the University for a lecture or 
a series of lectures, some outstanding national or world figure 
to speak on "Values of Living"- just as the late Chancellor 
proposed to do in his courses "The Human Situation" and 
"Plan for Li\ring." 
In the following June Mr. Rober LS circulated a letter on behalf of 
the Committee, proposing in somewhat broader terms that 
The income from this fund shou ld be spent in a q uest of so-
cial betterment by bringing to the University each year out-
stand ing world leaders for a lecture or series of lectures, yet 
with a design so broad in its outline that in the years to come, 
if it is deemed wise, this living memorial could take some 
more desirable form. 
The fund was allowed to accumulate until 1954, when Professor 
Richard McKeon lectured on "Human Rights and International 
Relations." The next lecture was given in 1959 by Professor Everett 
C. Hughes, and h as been published by the University of Kansas 
School o( L aw as part of his book Students' Culture and Perspec-
tives: L ectures on Medical and General Education. The selection 
of lecturers for the L indley series has since been delegated to the 
Department of Philosophy. The following lectures have been pub-
lished, and may be obtained from the Department a t a price of 
fifty cents each. 
1961. "The Idea of Man- An OuLiine of Philosophical Anlhropology." 
By Jose Ferrater Mora, Professor of Philosophy, Bryn Mawr College. 
1962. "Changes in EvenLS and Changes in Things." 
By A. N. Prior, Professor of Philosophy, University of Manchester. 
1963. "Moral Philosophy and the Anal ysis of Language." 
By Richard B. Brandt, Professor of Philosophy, Swarthmore College. 
1964. "Human Freedom and the Self." 
By Roderick M. Chisholm, Professor of Philosophy, Drown University. 
1965. "Freedom of Mind." 
By Stuarl Hampshire, Professor of Philosophy, Princeton University. 
19GG. "Some Beliefs about Justice." 
By William K. Frankena, Professor of Philosophy, University of Michigan. 
